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Abstract
Physical layer security (PLS) has been shown to hold promise as a new paradigm for securing wireless links.
In contrast with the conventional cryptographic techniques, PLS methods exploit the random fading in wireless
channels to provide link security. As the channel dynamics prevent a constant rate of secure communications
between the legitimate terminals, the outage probability of the achievable secrecy rate is used as a measure of the
secrecy performance. This work investigates the secrecy outage probability of a simultaneous wireless information
and power transfer (SWIPT) system, which operates in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers that also have the
energy harvesting capability. The loss in secrecy performance due to eavesdropper collusion, i.e., information sharing
between the eavesdroppers to decode the secret message, is also analyzed. We derive closed-form expressions for the
secrecy outage probability for Nakagami-m fading on the links and imperfect channel estimation at the receivers.
Our analysis considers different combinations of the separated and the integrated SWIPT receiver architectures at
the receivers. Numerical results are provided to validate our analysis.
Index Terms
Achievable Secrecy Rate, Outage Probability, Nakagami-m Fading
I. INTRODUCTION
Simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) systems have spurred considerable
research interest in both academia and industry [1]. The SWIPT technique provides significant convenience
to its users by efficiently utilizing the radio frequency (RF) signal for both information and power transfer
[2]. However, SWIPT systems require a special receiver design to support the dual capability of energy
harvesting (EH) and information decoding (ID). In the literature, two broad categories of SWIPT receiver
architectures have been proposed namely the separated and the integrated receiver architectures [1]. The
separated receiver architecture has dedicated separate units for ID and EH. However, this increases the
complexity and cost of the receiver hardware [3]. In contrast, the integrated receiver architecture has a
unified circuitry to perform ID and EH jointly, which reduces the hardware costs [3].
Varshney et al. in [4] were the first to propose the transmission of information and energy simultane-
ously. They developed a capacity-energy function to characterize the fundamental tradeoff in performance
between simultaneous information and power transfer. In [5], the authors extended the work of [4] to
frequency-selective channels with additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). It was shown in [5] that a
non-trivial tradeoff exists for information transfer versus energy transfer via power allocation. A SWIPT
system under co-channel interference was studied in [6]. The authors derived optimal designs to achieve
outage-energy tradeoffs and rate-energy tradeoffs. In [7] the authors considered the performance of a
SWIPT system with imperfect channel state information (CSI) at the transmitter. Networks that employ
pure wireless power transfer were studied in [8] and [9]. In [8], the authors studied a hybrid network
that overlaid an uplink cellular network with randomly deployed power beacons, which charged mobiles
wirelessly. The authors then derived the tradeoffs between different network parameters under an outage
constraint on the data links.
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2The broadcast nature of wireless signals implies that nodes other than the intended receiver may
also receive the transmitted message, which results in information leakage. Although cryptography-based
techniques are conventionally used to secure transmitted information, the high computational complexity
of these techniques consumes a significant amount of energy [10]. Recently, physical layer security (PLS)
has been proposed as an alternative for securing wireless communications by exploiting the channel
characteristics such as fading, noise, and interferences [11]. The secrecy performance of a cooperative
network was investigated in [12], [13]; secrecy for interference limited networks was studied in [14] and
for cognitive radio networks in [15], [16], [17]. In[18], the authors analyzed the secrecy performance
of a multicast network in which the transmitter broadcasted its information to a set of legitimate users
in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. The authors then proposed power minimization and secrecy
rate maximization schemes for the considered multicasting secrecy network. The security of large-scale
networks has also been characterized in terms of connectivity [19], coverage [20] and capacity [21].
Researchers have also considered so-called artificial noise generation techniques to reduce the signal-
to-interference ratio of the eavesdropper channel while minimizing the interference to the legitimate
link [22], [23]. The authors in [24], [25] studied cooperative jamming, whereby a relay transmitted an
interfering signal towards the eavesdropper while the source broadcasted its message. In [26], secure
beamforming techniques have been explored to maximize the received power at the legitimate receiver.
The PLS techniques are naturally applicable to SWIPT but the design of an optimal PLS techniques for
SWIPT systems is a non-trivial task since it needs to also consider the efficiency of the wireless power
transfer. In general, if a power receiver is a potential eavesdropper then any increase in the information
signal power to improve the power transfer efficiency may also compromise the message secrecy [6].
Therefore, the inherent tradeoff between power efficiency and information security in a SWIPT system
merits detailed examination. The authors in [27] investigated the maximization of secrecy throughput for
SWIPT systems. In particular, they considered power allocation between EH and ID to provide an optimal
secure SWIPT solution. In the same work an analytical expression for the secrecy outage probability was
also derived. In [28], the authors investigated the secrecy performance of a SWIPT system with the
separated receiver SWIPT architecture employed at the eavesdropper and κ − µ faded links. In [29] the
authors introduced an artificial noise-aided precoding scheme to maximize the secrecy rate. In [30] the
authors studied the secrecy capacity of an EH orthogonal-frequency-division-multiplexing network. All the
sub-carriers were allocated an identical power and the power-splitting technique was used to coordinate ID
and EH. In [31] the authors analyzed secure beamforming for an amplify-and-forward two-way relaying
SWIPT network and proposed a zero-forcing based sub-optimal solution to maximize the secrecy of the
considered network.
In the SWIPT literature most investigations have considered only the separated receiver architecture
[27], [29], [30], [31]. Furthermore, multiple eavesdroppers when considered are often assumed to operate
independently, whereas in many practical scenarios these eavesdroppers may collaborate to enhance their
secret message decoding capability [32]. Finally, the achievable secrecy rate may degrade significantly
under imperfect channel estimation at the legitimate receiver, whereas imperfect CSI at the eavesdropper
can prove beneficial for the system’s secrecy performance. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, a
comparative analysis of the secrecy performance of the separated and integrated SWIPT architectures
with eavesdropper cooperation and imperfect CSI has not been performed previously. Specifically, the
main contributions of the submitted work are listed as follows:
• We derive closed-form expressions for the secrecy outage probability with imperfect CSI knowledge
at the receivers and different combinations of the separated and the integrated SWIPT architectures
at the legitimate and the eavesdropping receivers.
• The tradeoff between secrecy performance and harvested energy is investigated.
• The loss in secrecy performance due to eavesdropper cooperation is analyzed and compared with the
non-cooperative case.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the system model. In Section
3III the closed-form expressions for the outage probability are derived for different receiver architectures.
Section IV provides numerical results along with relevant discussion. In Section V, some concluding
remarks are given.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the downlink of a SWIPT system as shown in Fig. 1 in which the Access Point (AP)
transmits a secure message to the legitimate receiver S, which has simultaneous EH and ID capability.
This transmission is also received by N eavesdropping nodes that are admitted into the network for EH-
only but exploit their SWIPT receiver architectures in an attempt to intercept the secret communication
between AP and S [33]. Since the eavesdroppers, denoted by E = {Ei|i = 1, 2, ...N}, are also part of the
network - the AP is assumed to have CSI for the main channel to node S as well as for the N wiretap
channels [33]. All nodes are considered to be equipped with single antennas.1 Our analysis considers two
types of receiver architectures for both S and E, i.e., the conventional separated receiver and the integrated
receiver architecture [3] shown in Fig. 2. In the separated receiver, the RF signal after power-splitting
(PS) is fed to separate circuitry for ID and EH, whereas in the integrated receiver PS between EH and
ID takes place after the rectifier. The rectifier of the integrated receiver also down-converts the RF signal
for ID, i.e., the down-conversion operation is integrated with the energy receiver in this architecture. For
both receiver types, the fractional powers received for ID and EH are denoted by 0 ≤ ρ < 1 and 1 − ρ,
respectively.
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Fig. 1. System Model.
Consider that the AP transmits signal s with power P . The signal received at S can then be written as
ys =
√
P
P losss
hˆss+ ns, (1)
where hˆs represents the channel gain estimated by S and ns denotes the zero-mean variance N0 additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) due to the receiver electronics at S. Additionally, P losss =
(4pi)2dΞs
GtGrλ2c
is the
path loss, where ds denotes the distance between AP and S and Ξ is the path loss exponent. Furthermore,
λc is the carrier wavelength and Gt and Gr are the antenna gains at AP and S, respectively.
Since S employs PS architecture, the received signal is further divided into two streams for ID and EH.
The signal at the information decoder of S is given as
ys =
√
ρs
(√
P
P losss
hˆss+ ns
)
+ zs, (2)
1Analysis for multi-antenna nodes [34] will be reported in future work.
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Fig. 2. Separated and integrated receiver architectures of SWIPT [3].
where ρs is the power splitting factor at S and zs is the signal processing noise at S, also distributed
normally as N (0, σ2s). Since 1 − ρs fraction of received power is used for energy harvesting, thus the
amount of harvested energy at S, ignoring small amount of energy stored by antenna and signal processing
noise, can be written as [3]
EHs =
ζs(1− ρs)P |hˆs|2
P losss
, (3)
where ζs represents the power conversion efficiency at S. The AP transmission is also picked up by the
eavesdroppers, the signal received at the information decoder of the i-th eavesdropper is written as
yie =
√
ρie
(√
P
P lossie
hˆies+ nie
)
+ zie, (4)
where hˆie represents the channel gain estimated by the i-th eavesdropper. Furthermore, nie = ne represents
the thermal noise distributed as N (0, N0) and zie = ze is the signal processing noise distributed as
N (0, σ2e), at the i-th eavesdropper. Here the noise statistics are assumed identical due to all eavesdroppers
using the same type of hardware. For a tractable analysis, we consider P lossie = P
loss
e and ρie = ρe∀i ∈ N .
Similar to (3), the amount of harvested energy at the i-th eavesdropper can be written as [3]
EHie =
ζie(1− ρie)P |hˆie|2
P lossie
, (5)
where ζie is the power conversion efficiency at the i-th eavesdropper. Moreover, without loss of generality,
we consider ζie = ζe throughout this work. Finally, the receiver nodes make an erroneous channel estimate
due to their hardware impairments modeled as [35], [36]
hˆk =
√
1− δ2khk + δkv, (6)
where k ∈ {s, ie}, hk represents the true channel amplitude gain. The parameter 0 < δk < 1 is a measure
of estimation accuracy with δk = 0 for a perfect estimate. Additionally, v is a normal random variable
distributed as N (0, 1). Now by substituting (6) into (2) we can express the signal received at S as
ys =
√
ρs
(√
P (1− δ2s)
P losss
hss+
√
P
P losss
δsvs+ ns
)
+ zs, (7)
5and substituting (6) into (4) we can express the signal received at i-th eavesdropper as
yie =
√
ρie
(√
P (1− δ2ie)
P losse
hies+
√
P
P losse
δievs+ nie
)
+ zie. (8)
Using the above equations, the instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the main channel can be
written as
χs =
ρsΩs(1− δ2s)
(Ωsρsδ2s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s)
|hs|2, (9)
and the SNR for the i-th wiretap channel can be expressed as
χie =
ρeΩe(1− δ2ie)
(Ωeρsδ2ie + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)
|hie|2, (10)
where Ωs = P/(P losss ) and Ωe = P/(P
loss
e ). For subsequent analysis, δie = δe,∀i ∈ N is considered.
III. SECRECY OUTAGE ANALYSIS
In this section closed form expressions for the secrecy outage probability are derived separately for
four different cases that are based on the receiver types used at S and E. Specifically, P Sp−Spout denotes
outage probability for the case of separated receiver architectures at S and E, P Sp−Inout denotes the outage
for separated receiver at S and integrated receiver at E, P In−Spout is the outage for integrated receiver at S
and separated receiver at E, and P In−Inout denotes outage probability for the case of integrated receivers at
both S and E. Each of these four cases are discussed first for the non-cooperative eavesdropping scenario
and later for cooperation among the eavesdroppers.
A. Non-cooperative Eavesdroppers
In this scenario, the worst-case of the eavesdropper with the maximum SNR is considered to decode
the message. The instantaneous SNR of the wiretap link can be re-written as
χe = max
i∈N
χie =
ρeΩe(1− δ2e)
(Ωeρsδ2e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)
max
i∈N
|hie|2. (11)
where χie is Gamma distributed [37] with probability density function (PDF) expressed as
fχie(γie) =
[
mie(Ωieρieδ
2
ie+ρieN0+σ
2
ie)
ρie(1−δ2ie)γ¯ie
]mie × exp(−mie(Ωieρieδ2ie+ρieN0+σ2ie)γie
ρie(1−δ2ie)γ¯ie
)
× (γie)mie−1
Γ(mie)
.
Then, the cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the instantaneous SNR of the wiretap link (i.e.
random variable χe falling below an arbitrary value γe), is given as
Fχe(γe) = Pr(χe < γe). (12)
Now using statistical independence of the wiretap channels and the CDF of a Gamma random variable
[38], we obtain
Fχe(γe) = Pr(χ1e < γe, χ2e < γe, . . . , χNe < γe),
=
[
1− exp
(
−me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)γe
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
)
×
me−1∑
r=0
1
r!
[
me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)γe
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
]r]N
, (13)
6The corresponding PDF can be written as
fχe(γe) =
dFχe(γe)
dγe
=
N(γe)
me−1
Γ(me)
[
me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
]me
×
[
1− exp
(
−me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)γe
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
)
×
me−1∑
r=0
1
r!
{
me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)γe
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
}r]N−1
× exp
(
−me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)γe
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
)
, (14)
where γ¯e = ΩeE{maxi∈N |hie|2} represents the average SNR of the wiretap link and me is the Nakagami-m
fading severity parameter for the wiretap link.
The PDF of the instantaneous SNR of the main link can be obtained as [37]
fχs(γs) =
[
ms(Ωsρsδ
2
s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s)
ρs(1− δ2s)γ¯s
]ms
×
(γs)
ms−1 exp
(
−ms(Ωsρsδ2s+ρsN0+σ2s)γs
ρs(1−δ2s)γ¯s
)
Γ(ms)
. (15)
The corresponding CDF is given as [37]
Fχs(γs) = 1− exp
(
−ms(Ωsρsδ
2
s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s)γs
ρs(1− δ2s)γ¯s
)ms−1∑
r=0
1
r!
×
[
ms(Ωsρsδ
2
s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s)γs
ρs(1− δ2s)γ¯s
]r
, (16)
where γ¯s = ΩsE{|hs|2} is the average SNR of the main link and ms represents the Nakagami-m fading
severity parameter for the main link.
1) Separated Receivers at S and E: The achievable rates for the main and wiretap links can be written
as Cs = log2(1 +χs) and Ce = log2(1 +χe), respectively [3]. The achievable secrecy rate Csec is defined
as the non-negative difference between the achievable rates of the main channel and wiretap channel,
which is expressed as Csec = [Cs − Ce]+. A secrecy outage event occurs when Csec falls below some
target rate Rs > 0 [39], [40]. The secrecy outage probability is then written as
P Sp−Spout = Pr(Csec < Rs)
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ 2Rs (1+γe)−1
0
fχs(γs)fχe(γe)dγsdγe,
=
∫ ∞
0
Fχs(2
Rs(1 + γe)− 1)fχe(γe)dγe. (17)
Now using (14) and (15) in (17) and with the help of [41, (8.352.4)], we obtain
P Sp−Spout =
N
Γ(me)
[
me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
]me
×
N−1∑
w=0
(
N − 1
w
)
(−1)w
Γ(me)Γ(ms)
×M(Ψ1,Ψ2), (18)
7where
M(a, b) =
∫ ∞
0
(γe)
me−1 exp(−mea)Γ(me,mea)w
× Γ(ms,msb)dγe,
Ψ1 =
(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)γe
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
,
Ψ2 =
(Ωsρsδ
2
s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s)(2
Rs(1 + γe)− 1)
ρs(1− δ2s)γ¯s
.
Furthermore, Γ(., .) is the upper incomplete Gamma function and Γ(.) is the Gamma function [41]. The
function M(a, b) can be readily evaluated using any computational software.
2) Separated Receiver at S and Integrated Receiver at E: In this case the achievable rate for the main
link is Cs = log2(1 + χs). On the wiretap link, the integrated receiver’s ID channel can be modeled as
a free-space optical intensity channel [3]. The asymptotic high-SNR achievable rate for this channel is
expressed as Ce = log2(χe) +
1
2
log2
e
2pi
, assuming that the signal processing noise dominates the antenna
noise [3], [42]. Then using the approach of (17), we obtain
P Sp−Inout =
∫ ∞
0
Fχs(2
RsγeC − 1)fχe(γe)dγe, (19)
where C =
√
e
2pi
. Substituting (14) and (15) in (19) and using [41, (8.352.4)], we get
P Sp−Inout =
N
Γ(me)
[
me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
]me
×
N−1∑
w=0
(
N − 1
w
)
(−1)w
Γ(me)Γ(ms)
×M(Ψ1,Ψ3). (20)
where Ψ3 =
(Ωsρsδ2s+ρsN0+σ
2
s)(2
RsγeC−1)
ρs(1−δ2s)γ¯s .
3) Integrated Receiver at S and Separated Receiver at E: In this case, the main link has an asymptotic
achievable rate of Cs = log2(χs) +
1
2
log2
e
2pi
[3], [42], whereas the achievable rate for the wiretapper
is Ce = log2(1 + χe). Then using a similar approach to (17) and after some manipulations, the outage
probability is given as
P In−Spout = 1−
∫ ∞
2Rs
C
Fχe
(
γsC
2Rs
− 1
)
fχs(γs)dγs. (21)
Substituting (13) and (15) in (21) and using the binomial theorem, we get
P In−Spout = 1−
N∑
z=0
(
N
z
)
(−1)z
Γ(ms)Γ(me)
×
[
ms(Ωsρsδ
2
s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s)
ρs(1− δ2s)γ¯s
]ms
T (Ψ4,Ψ5), (22)
where T (a, b) = ∫∞
2Rs/C
Γ(me,mea)
z(γs)
ms−1 exp(−msb)dγs involves a single integral and can be readily
evaluated in any computational software. Furthermore, Ψ4 =
(Ωeρeδ2e+ρeN0+σ
2
e)(
γsC
2Rs
−1)
ρe(1−δ2e)γ¯e and Ψ5 =
(Ωsρsδ2s+ρsN0+σ
2
s)γs
ρs(1−δ2s)γ¯s .
84) Integrated Receivers at S and E: In this case the main and wiretap links have asymptotic achievable
rates of Cs = log2(χs) +
1
2
log2
e
2pi
and Ce = log2(χe) +
1
2
log2
e
2pi
, respectively [3]. Then using the same
approach as that for deriving (17), we obtain
P In−Inout = 1−
∫ ∞
2Rs
Fχe
( γs
2Rs
)
fχs(γs)dγs. (23)
Replacing (13) and (15) in (23) and after some algebraic manipulations, we obtain
P In−Inout = 1−
N∑
z=0
(
N
z
)
(−1)z
Γ(ms)Γ(me)
×
[
ms(Ωsρsδ
2
s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s)
ρs(1− δ2s)γ¯s
]ms
T (Ψ6,Ψ5), (24)
where Ψ6 =
(Ωeρeδ2e+ρeN0+σ
2
e)
γs
2Rs
ρe(1−δ2e)γ¯e .
B. Cooperative Eavesdroppers
For the case of cooperative eavesdropping, the N eavesdroppers share information to form a virtual
antenna array for receive beamforming such that a single-input multiple-output (SIMO) channel exists
between the AP and the eavesdroppers [19]. The combined message ensures the maximum achievable
rate of the wiretap link. In this case the instantaneous SNR of the combined wiretap signal can be written
as
χe =
N∑
i=1
χie. (25)
The PDF of χe can be written as [43]
fχe(γe) =
(
me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
)Nme γNme−1e
Γ(Nme)
× exp(−me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
γ¯e). (26)
The CDF of the sum of independent, identically-distributed Gamma random variables is expressed as [38]
Fχe(γe) = 1− exp
(
−me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)γe
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
)
×
Nme−1∑
r=0
1
r!
(
−me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)γe
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
)r
. (27)
1) Separated Receivers at S and E: Using (26) and (15) in (17) and with the help of [41, (8.352.4)],
the secrecy outage probability for this case is expressed as
P Sp−Spout = 1−
(
me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
)Nme
U(Ψ1,Ψ2), (28)
where U(a, b) = ∫∞
0
γNme−1e
Γ(Nme)
exp(−mea)Γ(Nme,msb)Γ(Nme) dγe.
92) Separated Receiver at S, Integrated Receiver at E: Substituting (26) and (15) into (19), the secrecy
outage probability for this case is expressed as
P Sp−Inout = 1−
∫ ∞
0
(
me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
)Nme
× γ
Nme−1
e
Γ(Nme)
exp
(
−me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
γ¯e
)
× exp
(
−ms(Ωsρsδ
2
s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s)(2
RsγeC − 1)
ρs(1− δ2s)γ¯s
)
×
ms−1∑
r=0
1
r!
[
ms(Ωsρsδ
2
s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s)(2
RsγeC − 1)
ρs(1− δ2s)γ¯s
]r
dγe. (29)
After some simplifications and using [41, (8.352.4)], the secrecy outage probability is expressed as
P Sp−Inout = 1−
(
me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
)Nme
U(Ψ1,Ψ3). (30)
3) Integrated Receiver at S and Separated Receiver at E: Substituting (27) and (15) in (21), the secrecy
outage probability for this case is expressed as
P In−Spout = 1−
Γ(ms,
ms(Ωsρsδ2s+ρsN0+σ
2
s)γs
ρs(1−δ2s)γ¯s )
Γ(ms)
−
∫ ∞
2Rs
C
exp
(
−me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)γsC
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e2Rs
+
me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e2Rs
)
×
Nme−1∑
r=0
1
r!
×
(
−me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)γsC
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e2Rs
+
me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e2Rs
)r
(γs)
ms−1
Γ(ms)
×
[
ms(Ωsρsδ
2
s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s)
ρs(1− δ2s)γ¯s
]ms
× exp
(
−ms(Ωsρsδ
2
s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s)γs
ρs(1− δ2s)γ¯s
)
dγs. (31)
After some algebraic manipulations, we obtain
P In−Spout = 1−
Γ(ms,
ms(Ωsρsδ2s+ρsN0+σ
2
s)γs
ρs(1−δ2s)γ¯s )
Γ(ms)
−
[ms(Ωsρsδ
2
s+ρsN0+σ
2
s)
ρs(1−δ2s)γ¯s ]
ms
Γ(ms)
V(Ψ4,Ψ5), (32)
where V(a, b) = ∫∞2Rs
C
(γs)ms−1 exp(−msa)Γ(Nms,meb)
Γ(Nms)
dγs.
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Fig. 3. Comparison of secrecy performance between different SWIPT receiver architectures. (a) Rs = 1 bps/Hz (b) Rs = 2 bps/Hz.
4) Integrated Receivers at S and E: Replacing (27) and (15) in (23) and using a similar approach as
for the derivation of 32, the secrecy outage probability for this case is expressed as
P In−Inout = 1−
Γ(ms,
ms(Ωsρsδ2s+ρsN0+σ
2
s)γs
ρs(1−δ2s)γ¯s )
Γ(ms)
−
[ms(Ωsρsδ
2
s+ρsN0+σ
2
s)
ρs(1−δ2s)γ¯s ]
ms
Γ(ms)
V(Ψ6,Ψ5). (33)
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We now provide some numerical results to validate the analytical expressions derived in Section III.
The system parameters provided in Table I are used for result generation, unless stated otherwise.
S No. Simulation Parameter Value
1. Channel Realizations 105
2. Antenna Noise Variance N0 0.1 dB
3. Signal Processing Noise Variance σ2s = σ2e 0 dB
4. Target Secrecy Rate Rs 1 bit/sec/Hz
5. Main Link Power Ωs 30 dB
6. Wiretap Link Power Ωe 10 dB
7. Nakagami-m shape factor ms = me 2
8. Power splitting factor ρs = ρe 0.8
9. Channel estimation accuracy δs = δe 0.2
10. No. of eavesdroppers N 5
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS.
Fig. 3 compares the secrecy performance for different combinations of receiver architectures at the
legitimate receiver and the eavesdroppers. Fig. 3(a) shows that for any given value of γ¯s, the smallest
secrecy outage probability is achieved when S is equipped with a separated and E with an integrated
receiver architecture. on the other hand, the secrecy outage probability is the largest for the case when
S is equipped with an integrated and E with a separated architecture, all other parameters remaining
un-changed. The figure also shows that the outage probability increases with cooperation between the
eavesdroppers. Fig. 3(a) shows that by increasing γ¯s a steady reduction in the outage probability can be
achieved. However, at large values (γ¯s > 28 dB), an outage floor is introduced for both the cooperative
and non-cooperative cases, which shows that the outage probability does not decrease despite an increase
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Fig. 4. Effect of Nakagami-m parameter and eavesdropper cooperation on secrecy performance, δs = δe = 0.1. (a) Non-cooperative
eavesdroppers (b) Cooperative eavesdroppers.
ρ
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
S
ec
re
cy
O
u
ta
g
e
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
10-2
10-1
100
Analy. S→Separated, E →Integrated
Analy. S→Integrated, E →Separated
Simul. variable ρs, ρe = 0.5
Simul. variable ρe, ρs = 0.5
Black Lines: Cooperative Eve
Red Lines: Non-cooperative Eve
Fig. 5. Effect of power splitting factor ρ on the secrecy outage probability.
in the main link SNR. This floor appears because of the channel estimation errors for the main link. By
comparing Figs. 3(a) & (b), it can be observed that by increasing the target rate Rs, for a fixed γ¯s, the
outage probability increases for all receiver architecture combinations. Finally, comparing the two sub-
figures also reveals that the difference between the outage performance with and without eavesdropper
cooperation diminishes as Rs is increased from 1 to 2 bps/Hz. All graphs shown in the figures exhibit
a good match between the simulation and analytical results, which validates the accuracy of our derived
analytical expressions.
Fig. 4 shows the secrecy outage probability surface plotted against γ¯s and the Nakagami-m parameter,
for different receiver architectures at S and E. Figure 4(a), for the case of non-cooperative eavesdroppers,
shows that the secrecy outage probability decreases with an increase in ms = me, which corresponds to a
decreasing severity of the channel fading. Moreover, the figure shows that progressively larger values of
the Nakagami parameter (ms = me = m > 2, result in an increasing difference between the secrecy outage
probabilities achieved by the 4 receiver combinations; the combination of S separated and E integrated
receivers has the smallest outage as already observed in Fig. 3. By comparing Fig. 4(b), i.e., cooperative
eavesdroppers with Fig. 4(a) for the non-cooperating case, it can be observed that for a given γs and
identical system parameters, cooperation between the eavesdroppers significantly increases the secrecy
outage probability relative to that for the non-cooperative case.
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Fig. 6. Effect of imperfect CSI on the secrecy outage probability. (a) variable δs, fixed δe = 0.001. (b) variable δs, fixed δe = 0.5. (c)
variable δe, fixed δs = 0.001. (d) variable δe, fixed δs = 0.5.
Fig. 5 shows the impact of the PS factor ρ on the secrecy outage probability. To separately demonstrate
the effect of PS at S only, ρs is varied while the PS factor at the eavesdroppers is fixed at ρe = 0.5.
Another set of curves shown in Fig. 5 describe the effect of PS at eavesdroppers only, while ρs = 0.5 is
maintained for those curves. The figure shows that by increasing values of ρs the secrecy outage probability
decreases. This is because a larger fraction of the received power is then used for ID at S. In contrast,
the secrecy outage probability increases with increasing values of ρe. This is due to the fact that more
power is then allocated by the eavesdroppers to decode the secret message, which diminishes the system’s
secrecy performance.
Fig. 6 shows the impact of the channel estimation errors on the secrecy outage probability. Figs. 6(a),(b)
show that an increase in δs, the legitimate receiver’s estimation error, degrades the secrecy performance.
Whereas, Figs. 6(c),(d) show that an increase in δe, the eavesdropping receiver’s estimation error, reduces
the secrecy outage probability. This follows from the fact that the secrecy outage event is dependent on
the decoding ability of both the legitimate and the eavesdropper nodes. An imperfect channel estimate at
the eavesdropper increases its likelihood of incorrect decoding of the secret message, which reduces the
information leakage. One may also observe from the figure that an increasing error in CSI estimate of
the higher SNR main link has a more dominant effect on the secrecy outage probability than a similar
increase in CSI error on the wiretapping receivers. This can be verified by comparing the relative shift in
the secrecy outage curves between Fig. 6(a) and (b) with the relative shift in the secrecy outage between
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Fig. 6(c) and Fig. 6(d). This effect is more pronounced for the cooperating eavesdroppers case.
Fig. 7 shows the energy-secrecy capacity tradeoff for both cooperative as well as non-cooperative
eavesdroppers. Each tradeoff curve is generated by varying ρs between 0.01 and 0.99 with fixed ρe = 0.5.
However, plotting of each curve in Fig. 7 is restricted to its respective ρs sub-interval that produces a
non-negative secrecy capacity. This results in different energy levels, harvested according to (1− ρs), at
zero secrecy capacity as shown in Fig. 7. One may observe from the figure that the enhanced eavesdropper
performance due to cooperation diminishes the harvested energy conditional on a non-negative secrecy
capacity. The figure also shows that δs = δe = 0.001 achieves a better energy-secrecy operating point
than that of δs = δe = 0.2, which highlights the significance of having an accurate CSI estimate at the
main receiver. Moreover, the figure shows that when the number of eavesdroppers N increases from 5 to
10, the area of the energy-secrecy capacity region decreases significantly for both the cooperative as well
as the non-cooperative eavesdroppers. Finally, for a fixed number of eavesdroppers, the energy-secrecy
capacity region for non-cooperative eavesdroppers is larger than that of the cooperative eavesdroppers.
This highlights the fact that cooperation among the eavesdroppers considerably degrades the secrecy
performance of the system.
V. CONCLUSION
This work has investigated the secrecy outage probability for a SWIPT system operating in the presence
of cooperative eavesdroppers and different combinations of the SWIPT receiver architectures considered at
the legitimate receiver and the eavesdroppers. We derived closed-form expressions for the secrecy outage
probability for each of these cases and showed that the smallest secrecy outage probability is achieved
when the legitimate receiver has a separated architecture and the eavesdroppers have an integrated SWIPT
receiver. The worst-case scenario is when the legitimate receiver has an integrated architecture and the
eavesdroppers have separated SWIPT architectures; for a high main link SNR and Nakagami-m = 4, it
was shown that the secrecy outage probabilities achieved for these two extreme cases differ by an order
of magnitude. The effect of channel estimation errors was also investigated and it was shown that for the
main link average SNR greater than 28 dB, an outage floor appears, i.e., the secrecy outage probability
cannot be reduced further due to the channel estimation errors, despite an increase in the main link SNR.
Finally, it was shown that cooperation between the eavesdroppers significantly increases the secrecy outage
probability relative to that of the non-cooperative case for any combination of receiver architectures. Our
results are useful for analyzing the secrecy performance of different SWIPT receiver architectures and
eavesdropper cooperation.
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